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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ROCK-OLA MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

9266

DAN STEWART COMPANY, INC.,
and DAN STEWART,

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
PlaintiJf-respondent has been for many years a manufacturer of commercial phonographs. Defendants-appellants are
retail dealers in commercial phonographs. Since July 27, 1950,
appellants have been buying and reselling respondent's goods
as one of respondent's distributors, the parties having executed
new distributor contracts from time to time (Exh. 2).
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Between February 20, 1959, and April 1, 1959, appellants
ordered eleven phonograph machines from respondent and
used the machines but did not pay for them. Pursuant to the
terms of the agreement between respondent and appellants
(R. 42, Exh. 1), on July 1, 1959 respondent cancelled the
agreement and on August 20, 1959, filed this action for the
price of the machines. Subsequently respondent and appellants
entered into a stipulation (R. 9) by which respondent was to
have judgment on its complaint; in addition, appellants' untimely counterclaim for $50,000.00 (R. 7) interest and costs,
was permitted to remain.
At the pre-trial conference, appellants conceded that there
was no basis for paragraph 1 of their counterclaim in the
amount of $851.50 and this claim was stricken (R. 24). The
Court allowed appellants to file an Amended Counterclaim
(R. 25), the gravamen of which was that on January 2, 1959,
respondent and appellants had entered into an agreement
whereby appellants had the Hexclusive" right to sell respondent's products in a given territory; that respondent had breached
this agreement by Hconspiring" with another of its distributors,
one UniCon Distributing Company of Kansas City, Kansas,
to sell respondent's products in appellants' territory to a
c~mpany named B & G Sales. Appellants also alleged that
respondent had Hfraudulently, deceitfully, and with intent
to avoid said agreement and the terms thereof, and without
any notice whatsoever to defendants [appellants] appointed
said Baker and Gardner [ B & G Sales] distributors for said
machines in said territory."
At the pre-trial conference, respondent moved for summary
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judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that respondent was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. The motion was based on the record and
the depositions of appellant Dan Stewart and of two witnesses
called by appellants, R. ]. Baker and Melvin C. Gardner
(R. 24). Argument was heard and briefs were submitted
(R. 28). The Court granted respondent's motion and dismissed
appellants' counterclaim (R. 3 5).
This appeal is directed only to the trial court's order
dismissing defendants-appellants' counterclaim. To prevail,
appellants must show that the trial court erred in finding fron1
the undisputed evidence that:
1. The contract between respondent and appellants was

non-exclusive; and
2. The contract between respondent and appellants was

not breached by respondent.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The agreement under which respondent and appellants

\vere operating did not give appellants the exclusive right to
sell respondent's products in a given territory.
2. Even if the agreement had given appellants such an

exclusive right, there was no breach of this agreement by
respondent.
3. A summary judgment was properly awarded.
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ARGUMENT

I.
THE AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH RESPONDENT
AND APPELLANTS WERE OPERATING DID NOT GIVE
APPELLANTS THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL RESPONDENT'S PRODUCTS IN A GIVEN TERRITORY.
Appellants claim (R. 25) that respondent granted them
by contract an exclusive right to sell respondent's products in
a given territory. In evidence of this claim appellants introduced
the agreement (R. 42, Exh. 1) which is the subject of appellants' counterclaim.
Pages 9 and 10 of appellants' brief are largely devoted
to the proposition that there is a lack of mutuality of obligation
in the instant contract, and authorities are cited for the proposition that when such lack of mutuality exists in an agency
contract, the contract will be declared void. It appears that
appellants contend that there is in the instant case such a
lack of mutuality of obligation, and that therefore the agreement is void. It would seem that if appellants were correct,
they would have an extremely difficult time bringing suit for
damages for the breach of a void contract.
Nowhere between the four corners of the subject contract
does it appear that either party intended the agreement to
grant an exclusive right to sell.
This agreement was marked as Exhibit "1" in connection
with the deposition taken of defendant Dan Stewart (R. 43,
p. 3) . At line 26, page 4 of this deposition, the question was
asked:
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"Q. Let me call your attention to this provision of
Exhibit c 1' and I am refering to paragraph 3 which
is captioned CPritnary Sales Territory'-CThe following
territory is hereby allotted to distributor'-and you
were the distributor, weren't you?
A. Yes.

Q. ~As the territory which said distributor is primarily responsible for selling Rock-Ola equipment and
distributor agrees to use his best efforts diligently to
promote the sale of and to sell Rock-Ola equipment
in said territory. Distributor agrees that Rock-Ola shall
not be obligated or liable to distributor in any manner
whatsoever for or on account of orders or sales of
Rock-Ola equipment (including parts and accessories)
obtained or made by any other distributor or by any
other person or persons whomsoever in said described
territory; but Rock-Ola agrees that during the term
of this agreement, unless sooner terminated as in this
agreement set forth, and subject to its rights under
paragraph 6 hereof, Rock-Ola will not sell new RockOla equipment to any other distributor having an established place of business in said described territory.'
A. Yes.

Q. Now is that the provision you claim gives you the
exclusive?
A. Yes, sir."
It will be noticed that the caption to the above set forth
paragraph 4 is in large print, and states ((Primary Sales Territory." Paragraph 4 sets forth the territory in which the distributor wil be primarily responsible for selling Rock-Ola
equipment. The obvious inference here is that the parties
contemplated other parties selling Rock-Ola equipment in the
same territory. Indeed, paragraph 4 set forth above spells out

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

shall not be obligated or
liable to distributor in any manner whatsoever for or on account
of orders or sales of Rock-Ola equipment obtained or made
by any other distributor or by any other person or persons
whonzsoever in said described territory." Thus, not only did
unequivocally that the respondent

rr

the parties contemplate the possibility of sales in this territory
by some other person, but contracted that in such an event, the
manufacturer [respondent] would not be liable in any manner
to the dealer [appellants].
For the purpose of indicating the intentions of the parties
in entering into the subject contract, appellants introduced at
the pre-trial conference (R. 31) certain former agreements
entered into between appellants and respondent, which agreements were dated January 1, 1954, July 27, 1950, and January
1, 1955 (Exh. 2). According to appellants, at page 6 of their
brief:
''The other agreements for previous years, introduced and received at the pre-trial, used the word
'exclusive' distributor. The word 'exclusive' was deleted from the 1959 contract. However, the 1959 distributor agreement was and is by its terms an exclusive
agreement, even though the word 'exclusive' has been
deleted.''
However, a perusal of these prior agreements indicates that
appellants are not completely accurate. The contract of July
27, 1950, states in paragraph 1:
"Rock-Ola hereby grants to distributor and distributor hereby accepts appointment as a non-exclusit~e
distributor * * * .''
The 1954 and 1955 agreements state, respectively, in
paragraph 1:
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"Rock-Ola hereby grants to distributor and distributor hereby accepts appointment as the exclusive
distributor * * * ."
And in paragraph 5:
nDistributor agrees not to sell Rock-Ola equipment ,
directly or indirectly to any person, firm or corporation
\vhose place of business is located outside distributor's
allotted territory.''
The governing agreement, that of January 1, 1959 (R. 42,
Exh. 1), omits any such mention of the words nexclusive
appointment and states that the territory allotted to the distributor is the territory in which the distributor is nprimarily
responsible" for selling Rock-Ola equipment; nor does the
instant agreement contain any restriction against selling outside
of the territory. Pages 1 and 2 of the 1955 and 1954 contracts
have the word nexclusive" printed at the bottom of the first
page. The 1959 contract does not have the word ((exclusive"
at the bottom of the first page, nor indeed, does it appear
anywhere in the contract. Clearly, the parties expressly negotiated the point of exclusiveness at each new contract. Appellants had operated under both exclusive and non-exclusive
contracts in the past, and knew that each year a new contract
was negotiated (R. 43, p. 4).
Contracts of this kind are not pure sales contracts, but
have some of the characteristics of agency and factorage
contracts, Bendix Home Appliances, Inc. v. Radio Accessories
Conzpany, 129 F.2d 177 (8 Cir., 1942). In Indiana Road
i.\tlachinery Company v. Lebanon Carriage and Emplement
Company, 25 K.L.R. 1763, (Ky. Court of Appeals) 78 S.W.
861 ( 1904) , the Court said:
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(CAn exclusive agency will not be created by implication where the words of the contract do not naturally
import this meaning."

In Dahath Electric Company v. Suburban Electric Development Company, 332 Penn. 129, 2 A.2d 765 ( 1938), an action
was brought by a dealer against the distributor for accounting
of sales made by another agent appointed for the same territory,
based upon the theory that the plaintiff had an exclusive agency
contract with the distributor for the sale of its appliances.
The Court said that had the parties contemplated an exclusive
agency contract they would have so provided in the written
contract. The Court then held that no exclusive agency was
created by implication from language of provisions in the
contract referring to ctthe dealer, his territory," and ctthe dealer's territory''; or from a reservation of a right in the distributor
to increase or decrease the agent's territory, or from the requirement that the agent send the distibutor copies of its installation
reports, lists of prospective purchasers, etc., and that the agent
maintain installation and repair service.
The cases cited by appellants on pages 3, 4 and 5 of
appellants' brief are set forth as authority for the interpretation
of the subject contract. These are cases interpreting contracts
wherein it is stated that the contracts are to be exclusive, but
where it is not clear whether the spelled-out exclusiveness
goes merely to the agency or the right to sell, a distinction
which is made in 2 Am. Jur., Agency, § 307:
"Whether or not an agent who is given an exclusive
agency or right to sell specified property or goods of
the principal, or is given the exclusive right to sell
the san1e within the specified territory is entitled to
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compensation in the event that such property or goods
are sold, or are sold within the certain territory, by the
principal or by another agent, depends upon the inter·
pretation of the contract of employment. According
to the cases and the American Law Institute Restatement of the La'v of Agency, a contract to give an
'exclusive agency' to deal with specified property is
ordinarily interpreted as not precluding competition
by the principal personally, but only as precluding
him from appointing another agent to accomplish the
result. On the other hand, a grant of an 'exclusive
agency' to sell, i.e., the exclusive right to sell the
products of a manufacturer or dealer in a specified
territory, is ordinarily interpreted as precluding competition by the principal in any form within the designated section. In other words, a distinction has been
made between an ~exclusive agency' and an exclusive
right to sell, the principal having a right to sell without
the payment of compensation to the agent in the former
case, but not in the latter."
Appellants do not cite cases going to the issue of whether
or not the instant agreement gave appellants the exclusive right
to sell respondent's products in a given territory, but rather
that the contract itself spelled out exclusiveness, and was
ambiguous only as to whether the exclusiveness was an exclusive agency or an exclusive right to sell.
The agreement herein (R. 42, Exh. 1) is an integrated
contract between the parties, and indeed, appellant Dan
Stewart does not claim otherwise, page 4, line 6 of his deposition (R. 43) :

HQ. Is that the agreement on which you rely in this
proceeding ?
A. Mainly, yes.
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Q. Is there any other agreement?
A. No, that would be the full agreement, as far as
I know."
However, appellants contend on page 6 of their brief that
the subject agreement ((was and is by its terms an exclusive
agreement even though the word (exclusive' has been deleted."
Appellants rely for their contention on paragraph 22, which
states:
((Distributor shall not sell nor solicit or receive orders
for any products manufactured by any company other
than Rock-Ola which competes with Rock-Ola equipment whether current year or prior year equipment.
This restriction will not apply to the sale of used
equipment or parts."
This provision pertains only to appellants in their capacity
as distributor and has a legitimate business purpose without
regard to any restrictions on the manufacturer.
A restriction on the distributor, such as paragraph 22, is
feasible and usual in business dealings to protect the manufacturer who is expending sums on advertising and promotion of
its wares, which advertising and promotion redounds to the
benefit of the distributor as well as to that of the manufacturer.
The manufacturer in effect lends its name and reputation to
the dealer, allows the dealer to hold himself out as one of
the manufacturer's dealers and in return requires the dealer
to bend all his efforts toward promoting only its wares. The
manufacturer hopes thus to tncrease sales and insure adequate
customer service. In addition the dealer must carry a full line
and not merely fast moving items. There is nothing unfair
about such an arrangement and indeed it is standard procedure
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in practically every industry between manufacturers and distributors. Surely the appellants would not have the Court
believe that parties cannot enter into such a contract.
As shown above, the agreement did not bestow upon
appellants the exclusive right to sell respondent's products,
nor did the parties contemplate such an exclusive agreement.
Moreover, the respondent could not contract with appellants
to refuse to sell its merchandise to any other person or distributor at its factory without being in danger of possible
violation of statutes prohibiting restraint of trade, such as the
Sherman Act.

II.
EVEN IF THE AGREEMENT HAD GIVEN APPELLANTS SUCH AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT, THERE WAS NO
BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT BY RESPONDENT.
Even assuming a straining of the subject agreement so as
to read into it an exclusiveness which obviously is not present,
the facts elicited through discovery procedure have demonstrated that there was no breach of such an agreement.
Appellants apparently contend that:
1. Respondent wrongfully cancelled appellants out as a

dealer of respondent's merchandise;

2. Respondent sold its products directly to B & G Sales,
an independent dealer of commercial phonographs;
3. Respondent conspired with UniCon Distributing Company of Kansas City, Kansas, one of respondent's dealers,
to sell respondent's products to B & G Sales indirectly; and
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4. Respondent financed such sales.
On page 7 of their brief, appellants state that Mr. Ste\vart
received a letter on July 7, 1959, sent on July 1, 1959, terminating the dealer agreement between appellants and respondent
and refer to page 21 of Mr. Stewart's deposition. The testimony
of Mr. Stewart should be read in full context, beginning at
page 20, line 14, and continuing through line 20, page 21:
((A. The answer to that is that we were still planning
on selling Rock-Ola equipment. Because of not paying
the $9,000 debt owed, the franchise was cut off and
given to B & G Sales. Therefore, we have a number of
parts which is useless to us, and have a number of
sales which we were unable to fulfill.

Q. Now, you say that Rock-Ola cancelled your
agreement. When was that?
A. To the best of my knowledge four months ago.
I don't have the exact date.

Q. That would be around June, July of 1959, is
that right?
A. Around July, yes-July 1st.

Q. And how did they cancel it?
A. They just started to shipping the B & G Sales
(sic).

Q. Did they notify you they were cancelling it?
A. No, they didn't.

Q. They did not?
A.

No.

Q. What you they do other than ship to B & G?
A. They sent me a registered letter which I didn't
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get, and also a copy of it was sent to the B & G, which
I later found out they were the new distributor.

Q. You say they sent you a registered letter which
you didn ·t get?
A. That's right.

Q. You 1nean it wasn't delivered or you refused to
receive it?
A. I was out of town at the time and nobody signed
for it and they sent it back to them.
D. Do you know what was in that letter?
A. I heard later that it was-through the B & G
- I heard later that it was appointing the B & G as
their new distributor.
MR. DUNCAN: Will you ask him to fix the date
of that letter, as near as you can?
A. That would be around July the 1st.

Q. Now do you claim that Rock-Ola did not have
the right to cancel the agreement
A. No, I don't claim that."

Appellants state at page 8 of their brief that respondent
shipped some machines ((directly to Salt Lake City from RockOla - - Stewart purchased one of these machines and saw
the label and serial numbers on the other." Appellants refer
to appellant Dan Stewart's deposition, pages 11 and 12. It
closer look at the deposition (R. 43) shows otherwise. See page
11, line 28 and page 12, lines 1 through 19:

ttQ. Do you know that any of them were shipped
direct by Rock-Ola to Salt Lake City?

A. Oh, yes, yes.
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Q. How do you know that?
A. I know the one that I bought was shipped direct,
because I know that one.

Q. How do you know that?
A. How do I know? It came in the crate. The crate
had the labels on it when we picked it up.

Q. What labels?
A. The UniCon labels to B & G Sales.

Q. And how would that show it was shipped from
Rock-Ola?
A. It also had Rock-Ola' s labels.

Q. How did that show it was shipped direct by
Rock-Ola to Salt Lake City?
A. How would that? Now actually I donJt claim
that; I donJt know for sure?
The positive showing by appellant Dan Stewart that
there were no shipments made by respondent to B & G Sales
was amply corroborated by one of the witnesses called by
appellants, Mr. Melvin C. Gardner [the G of B & G Sales],
who testified at page 26 of his deposition (R. 44) that he no
longer was employed by the B & G Sales Company, and on
page 28 that he no longer owns any stock in said company.
At page 30, Mr. Gardner testified definitely that he knew
there was never any merchandise shipped directly from RockOla Manufacturing Company to B & G Sales Company. At
page 32 of his deposition, he testified that he received all
the merchandise that came to B & G Sales and here again
stated that no merchandise ever came from respondent to
B & G Sales.
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Appellants' amended counterclaim (R. 2 5) alleges the
breach in 1959 of a contract made in January of 1959. However, on page 7 of their brief, appellants maintain that respondent sold a new current model machine to B & G Sales all
through 1958. On cross-examination (R. 44, p. 37), Mr.
Gardner's testimony was as follows:

ceQ. I believe you testified that you were a mechanic?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you take care of the repatrtng of these
machines?
A. Yes.
Q. Where 'Nould you obtain the parts to repatr
them, the Rock -0 Ia machines ?
A. From Dan Stewart Company.
Q. Did you ever obtain any from Rock-Ola?
A. No, they wouldn't sell them to us.
Q. Did you ever ask them to?

A. Yes.
Q. And they refused to sell them to you ?
A. Said we would have to buy them through the
Dan Stewart Company.

Q. I believe you mentioned there were some older
models and then you mentioned some newer models.
By 'newer', do you mean new?
A. Well, the policy that UniCon had, they wouldn't
sell any new. They would sell us floor samples or a
year old or older.
Q. Had they been used?

A. Yes, they had been used."
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Thus the record shows that the respondent did not sell
any equipment, new or used, in Utah other than to appellants,
and further, that B & G Sales Company never received any
new equipment from UniCon Distributing Company, Inc.,
which company appellants admit (R. 43, p. 14, 1. 7) is merely
a distributor of Rock-Ola Manufacturing Company and completely independent of respondent, located, incidentally, in
Kansas City (R. 43, p. 14, 1. 10) rather than in Wichita, as
alleged in appellants' amended counterclaim (R. 26). Indeed,
appellants admit (R. 43, p. 15, 1. 6-8) that respondent could
do nothing to stop B & G Sales from selling to any one in
appellants' territory.
Appellants complain on page 8 of their brief that respondent financed purchases made by B & G Sales from UniCon
Distributing Company, Inc. The record discloses (R. 42,
Exh. 2) that four conditional sale agreements for the purchase
of phonographs were executed by R. ]. Baker and Ellen M.
Baker, whose addresses appeared on the contract as 140
South Kansas Street, Wichita, Kansas, in favor of UniCon
Distributing Company, Inc. One of these four agreements was
dated January 20, 1958, and stated that the said Bakers would
pay to the order of UniCon Distributing Company, Inc., the
sum of $9,788.80 in 24 monthly payments. This paper was
sold by UniCon Distributing Company, Inc., to respondent and
the said Baker is still making payments thereon (R. 44, p. 6,
1. 16-29). The other contracts were discounted to various
banks (R. 44, p. 6, 1. 4). Appellants apparently would have
the Court believe that the purchase of a single conditional
sale contract from a distributor by a manufacturer, \vhen on
the face of it, the paper shows that the merchandise was
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destined for an address within that same distributor's territory,
would amount to wilfull fraud upon another distributor.

III.
A SUMMARY
AWARDED.

JUDGMENT

WAS

PROPERLY

The agreement (R. 42, Exh. 1) which is the subject of
appellants' counterclaim (R. 25), is clear and unequivocal.
There is no ambiguity to be construed as to whether or not
this agreement is an agreement for an exclusive franchise to
sell new machines in the territory set forth.
However, assuming arguendo that the agreement was
uexclusive", the record is devoid of any facts showing ( 1) a
sale of new Rock-Ola equipment in appellants' territory by
anyone other than appellants, or (2) fraud or ((conniving''
of any type on the part of respondent. Appellants have merely
attempted, by their pleadings and brief, to raise an innuendo
of fraudulent conduct on the part of the respondent, with no
facts to support such an innuendo. Indeed, if any such facts
did exist, it would seem that, at the very least, affirmative
showing other than mere hints of chicanery would be forthcoming from Ronald C. Barker, who was the attorney for
R. J. Baker (R. 44, p. 22, 1. 18-22), and apparently quite close
to his business (R. 44, p. 15, 1. 29). But the questioning
of his erstwhile client failed to disclose any actions other than
those of an independent merchant who bought where he could
(R. 44, p. 12, 1. 14-30, p. 13, 1. 1-16), sold where he could
(R. 44, p. 11, 1. 7-21), and didn't mind who knew it (R. 44,

p. 17' 1. 14-18) .
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In Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Company, 4 Utah
2d 303, 293 P.2d 700 ( 1956), it was alleged that the defendant,
through its president, had conspired to defraud plaintiff's
predecessors in connection with a business transaction. The
trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits
comprising the record. The Utah Supreme Court said in upholding the trial court:
((We do not feel that appellant can be permitted
to draw favorable inferences from these facts. Inferences are made for the purpose of aiding reason, not
to override it. Inferences are nothing more than the
probable or natural explanation of facts. Common
sense and reason dictate that evil inferences should
not be permitted to be drawn from routine business
transactions where there are no other circumstances.
To hold otherwise woudl throw the door open for an
attack on each and every transaction that one might
enter into."
In Alvardo v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954),
the Utah Supreme Court said, in affirming the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of defendant:
((The burden \vas upon the plaintiff * * * ; such a
finding of fact could not be based on mere speculation
or conjecture, but only on the preponderance of the
evidence. This means the greater "reight of the evidence,
or, as is sometimes stated, such a degree of proof that
the greater probabtiity of truth lies therein, a choice
of probabilities does not meet this requirement. _Jt
creates only a basis for conjecture, upon which a verdiCt
of the jury cannot stand."
Apparently, appellants would like the Court to believe
that in this case there are many facts that don't meet the eye.
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If such facts do exist, why are they not in the record? In
1lbdu/kadir v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, 7 Utah 2d
53, 318 P.2d 339 ( 1957), the Court said:

"The first attack plaintiff makes upon the summary
judgment is that the procedure is to_o hasty. He says
that if the case had been allowed to come to trial in its
regular turn on the calendar, he might have been able
to produce another witness or witnesses. This contention is without merit. The accident happened over
a year before the motion for summary judgment was
entered. There was no reasonable assurance that the
witness referred to, a resident of California, might
be found within a reasonable time, or at all, nor that
his testimony would help plaintiff if available. Speaking generally, it is to be assumed that when a plaintiff
files his action, he has sufficient evidence to demonstrate a right to recover. All he is entitled to is a
reasonable opportunity to marshal and present such
evidence.''
CONCLUSION
Appellants admit that they obtained over $9,000 worth
of goods from respondent for which they have not paid. Their
only defense is a naked claim that respondent perpetrated a
fraud upon appellants and that respondent breached a contract
which appellants contend is void. The lower court gave more
than ample opportunity to appellants to come forth with
some showing of facts sufficient to establish fraud or a breach
of contract. This appellants could not do and the trial court
was faced with a record replete with admissions and testimony
conclusively establishing that:
1. There was no fraudulent conduct by respondent;
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2. The subject contract did not establish an exclusive

agency; and
3. Even if the contract had been exclusive, there had been
no breach thereof.
The trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Peter W. Billings
Dudley M. Amoss
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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